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THE EFFECT IN VIRGINIA OF CONVICTION OF 
CRIME ON COMPETENCY AND CREDIBILITY 
OF WITN~SSES 
Statutes Collected 
AT COMMON law, a person convicted of treason, felony, or any misdemeanor of the sort known by the term crimen 
falsi was incompetent afterwards to be a witness.1 The precise 
scope of the crimen falsi has never been exactly defined, but it is 
agreed that petit larceny, forgery, and criminal fraudulent prac-
tices are included therein.2 This rule of exclusion had its origin 
late in the 1600s.3 The first statute passed in colonial Virginia 
on this subject was in the year 1748 and read as follows: 
"And whereas convicts, as well as negroes, mulattos, and In-
dians, are commonly of such -base and corrupt principles, 
that their testimony cannot be depended upon: To prevent 
the mischiefs which may happen, by admitting such pre-
' Taylor v. Beck, 3 Rand. (24 Va.) 316 (1825). 
• 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 937-938. 
• Id. at 933. 
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carious evidence, Be it further enacted, by the authority 
aforesaid, That no person convicted, and sentenced to trans-
portation, as is herein before recited, shall be admittea in 
any court of this colony, or before any justice of peace to 
be sworn as a witness, or to give evidence in any cause, 
civil or criminal, except against or between any other con-
victs, until the term for which such person was sentenced 
to be transported, shall appear to be fully expired * * *." 4 
A number of statutes on these matters have been passed sub-
sequently by the Commonwealth as follows: 
"No person convicted of perjury shall be capable of being a 
witness in any case, * * *." (1777) 5 
1. "Be it enacted by the general assembly, That no person 
convicted of treason, murder or other felony whatsoever, 
shall be admitted as a witness in any case whatsoever, un-
less he be first pardoned, or shall have received such punish-
ment, as by law ought to be inflicted upon such conviction." 
2. "No person convicted of perjury, although he be pardoned 
or punished for the same, shall ·be capable of being a wit-
ness in any case." ( 1792) 6 
"No person convicted of felony shall be admitted as a witness 
in any case unless he be first pardoned, or shall have been 
punished for such felony; but no person convicted of any 
perjury, although he be pardoned or punished for the same, 
shall be capable of being a witness in any case." ( 1847 -48) 7 
"Except where it is otherwise e..xpressly provided, a person 
com·icted of felony shall not be a ''"itness, unless he has 
been pardoned or punished therefor, and a person convicted 
of perjury shall not be a witness, although pardoned or 
punished." ( 1849) 8 
The last mentioned remained the statutory rule of this State 
until the 1919 revision, save only that in the revision of 1887 it 
was giYen the Section Number 3898 and the title, ((Convicts as 
·witucsscs". 
In the 1919 revision there is a fundamental change made in 
the law in keeping with the general policy of growing liberaliza-
• 5 HE;.;:n;c's STATUTES AT LARGt 546-547 . 
.. 9 Id. 411. 
• 1 STATrTts AT LARGE (N. s.) 196. 
t Virginia Acts of Assembly 1847-48, p. 124. 
• ConE OF VIRGINIA 1849, c. 199, § 19. 
472 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
tion in the admission of evidence. The statute now reads as 
follows: 
Section 4779. "Convicts as witnesses.-Conviction of felony 
or perjury shall not render the convict incompetent to tes-
tify, but the fact of conviction may be shown in evidence 
to affect his credit." 
It will be observed that none of these statutes say one word as 
to the status of one who has been convicted of an infamous 
crime not amounting to felony or perjury and of the nature of 
the crimen falsi such as petit larceny, forgery, receiving stolen 
property, and the like. 
Meaning of the Word "Convict" in Our Present Statute 
The title of our present statute is "Convicts as witnesses" 
and it is the "convict'' that is rendered capable of testifying, but 
who can be impeached by showing the fact of conviction of 
felony or perjury. The question at once arises whether the term 
"convict" has the popular meaning of one confined in a peni-
tentiary under sentence of conviction, or the original meaning 
of one who has been convicted of a felony at any time. While 
both meanings are given in modern dictionaries, it has been 
taken for granted by the courts of this State that the statute has 
used the word in its original sense. To hold otherwise would 
lead to one of two equally undesirable results, viz., that convicts 
who have served their sentences must be treated as any other 
witnesses and not be subject to impeachment for conviction of 
crime; or, that since the status of such persons is not mentioned, 
they are still incompetent witnesses under common law prin-
ciples. T.he Supreme Court of Appeals has ·repudiated the first 
of these alternatives, 9 and the second one (if adopted) would 
place convicts still serving their terms in a better position than 
convicts who had fully served their terms. In addition, it would 
be contrary to the whole modern tendency of liberalization. 
Moreover th~re is one class of cases where the convict never 
goes to the penitentiary, as in the case of the imposition of a jail 
sentence or fine in lieu of a sentence to the penitentiary, where 
• See Davidson v. Watts & Flint, 111 Va. 394, 69 S. E. 328 (1910). 
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such punishment is allowed in the discretion of the jury. In 
such cases 1:he fact of conviction can be shown to impeach the 
witness so convicted 10 it being well settled that it is the possibility 
of giving confinement in the penitentiary as punishment rather 
than the action of so giving it that determines whether an of-
fence is a felony or a misdemeanor.11 
So we are safe in concluding that "convicts" refers to anyone 
who has been convicted of a felony and not merely to those who 
are still serving their sentences (subject to what is stated in the 
next section). 
Effect of Conviction of Felony or Perjury in Another Jurisdiction 
There are two Virginia cases which hold that under our stat-
ute as it existed prior to 1919, a conviction in the courts of an-
other jurisdiction of felony or perjury did not disqualify the 
witness in the courts of Virginia.12 In neither of these cases is 
there any discussion of whether or not such conviction could be 
shown for purposes of impeachment. But since conviction of 
felony or perjury in the Federal courts or in the courts of a sis-
ter State is just as relevant on the question of veracity as a con-
viction in our own courts, it is just as desirable to allow such a 
conviction to be shown in the one case as in the other. This is 
Wigmore's view.13 In Samuel's case 14 the court quoted Green-
leaf on Evidence approvingly as follows: 
"Whether judgment of an infamous crime, passed by a for-
eign tribunal, ought to be allowed to affect the competency 
of a witness in the courts of this country is a question upon 
which jurists are not entirely agreed. But the weight of 
modern opinion seems to be that personal disqualifications, 
not arising from the law of nature, but from the positive 
law of the country, and especially such as are of a penal 
1° Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1007, 175 S. E. 895 (1934). 
11 Id. 
"' Samuels v. Commonwealth, 110 Va. 901, 66 S. E. 222 (1909) (convic-
tion for perjury in a Federal court sitting in Virginia) ; Kain v. Angle, 111 
Va. 415, 69 S. E. 355 (1910) (conviction for felonious fraud in a Federal 
court sitting in Virginia). 
"' 2 \VIG!IIoRS, EvmENCS (2d ed. 1923) 363. 
11 Supra n. 12. 
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nature, are strictly territorial, and cannot be enforced in any 
country other than 1:hat in which they originated. Accord-
ingly, it has been held, upon great consideration, that a con-
viction and sentence for a felony in one of the United States 
did not render 1he party incompetent as a witness in the 
courts of another State; though it might be shown in dimu-
nition of the credit due to his testimony." (Italics added.) 
There are a number of decisions outside of Virginia that have 
allowed convictions in other jurisdictions to be shown by way 
of impeachment.15 
Thus it would seem that the law. on this question would be 
clear; but there is some doubt thrown upon -the matter as the re-
sult of a headnote to Uhl v. Commonwealth,l6 there being in that 
case a refusal of a writ of error without any written opinion, 
and hence no discussion of our question. The headnote- in ques-
tion reads, "A record of the conviction of a witness for petty 
larceny, in another State, is not admissible evidence to impeach 
the veracity of the witness". This, of course, implies that the 
fact that the conviction was in another State is the reason that 
it can not be shown to impeach a witness in this State. But 
when it is considered ( 1) that it was petit larceny (only a mis-
demeanor) that was involved, (2) that there is no opinion to 
support the headnote, and (3) that the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in Barbour v. Commonwealth 17 says that the decision in 
Uhl v. Commonwealth 18 does not appear to rest upon that 
ground, it is believed that the doubt raised hy that headnote is 
totally dispelled, and that conviction of felony or perjury (at least 
where the crime would be felony or perjury if committed in Vir-
ginia) in the courts of another jurisdiction can be shown by way 
of·impeachment. 
Effect of Conviction of Petit Larceny and the Crimen Falsi 
At common law conviction of the crime of ·petit larceny dis-
qualified a witness. In our statutory enactments only the terms 
"' See for instan,ce Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N. E. 
407 (1922); State v. Foxton, 166 Iowa 181, 147 N. W. 347 (1914). 
•• 6 Gratt. (47 Va.) 706 (1849). 
11 80 Va. 287 (1885). 
16 Supra n. 16. 
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"felony" and "perjury" are used, and hence it is arguable that 
these statutes have no effect on the common law rule of disquali-
fication for conviction of the crime of petit larceny, and that 
conviction of that crime still renders the convicted one incom-
petent. But if we so decided, we would have the ridiculous re-
sult that one convicted of grand larceny was a competent wit-
ness while one convicted of petit larceny was not. 
In Barbour v. Comm01twealth 19 the issue was presented 
squarely to our Supreme Court of Appeals. The Court held that 
our statutes suspended the whole common law on this subject 
and hence that any witness was competent (so far as conviction 
for crime might be concerned) unless expressly excluded by our 
statutes. And as petit larceny is not a felony or perjury, the wit-
ness is competent. 
But can the fact of the witness' conviction be shown to im-
peach his credibility? On principle one who shop-lifts mer-
chandise worth forty-nine dollars is just as unlikely to tell the 
truth as one who steals property worth fifty dollars. And in 
other jurisdictions there are decisions to the effect that convic-
tion of petit larceny can be shown to impeach a witness.20 But 
in Barbour v. Commonwealth 21 the court not only refused to 
disqualify the witness who had been convicted in Virginia of 
petit larceny, but also refused to allow his impeachment by show-
ing his conviction (semble) on the ground that such a proceed-
ing would violate the rule against proving particular discredita-
ble acts rather than proof of general character for truth. It is 
necessary to say usemble" for it does not specifically appear that 
the particular acts and offences committed by the witness in-
cluded his conviction of the crime of petit larceny. 
In Smith v. Commonwealth 22 the Supreme Court of Appeals 
speaking through Mr. Justice Holt said, 
"It is not proper to ask a witness if he has been indicted, and it 
is not proper to show that he has ·been convicted of an or-
dinary misdemeanor * * *." (Italics added.) 
,. Supra n. 17. 
"" See for instance State v. Dyer, 139 Mo. 199, 40 S. W. 768 (1897). 
"' Supra n. 17. 
"' 155 Va. 1111, 156 S. E. 577 (1931). 
476 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
Quaere : Does this mean that it is proper to show that he has 
been convicted of a misdemeanor which (unlike the general run 
of misdemeanors) would indicate that he might not be worthy 
of belief upon the witness stand? 
The right to impeach a witness for any crime involving his 
character for truth is recognized, -at least impliedly, by Lang-
horne's case 23 and -some dicta in other cases. In Langhorne's 
case 24 a witness was asked, "Were you not arrested, tried, and 
convicted before a magistrate's court in the city of Lynchburg?'' 
An objection was sustained. The Supreme Court of Appeals 
approved the sustaining of the objection, saying, 
"The question does not imply that the witness had been guilty 
of an offense which would affect his credibility on oath, and 
unless it was shown by the question that the inquiry was in 
relation to such a conviction, the prisoner was not entitled 
to an answer." 
Since only a misdemeanor could have been involved (as the 
magistrate had no jurisdiction over felony trials), there is clear 
implication that if the offense had been of such a nature as to 
affect his credibility on oath then the conviction could have been 
shown. 
As to the dicta, the most prominent pronouncement is that of 
Judge Burks in Harold v. Commonwealth 25 in which the learned 
judge said, 
"Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, it is well settled in this 
state that the character of a witness for veracity cannot be 
impeached by proof of a prior conviction of crime, unless 
the crime be one which involved the character of the witness 
for veracity." 
Note that Judge Burks does not say "felony'' but "crime". 
Whether or not a witness may be impeached by showing his 
conviction of a misdemeanor affecting his credibility is thus left 
in doubt. If he cannot be, it is regrettable. The matter should 
be clarified by statute. 
"" 76 Va. 1012 (1882). 
"' Supra n. 23 • 
., 147 Va. 617, 136 S. E. 658 (1927). 
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Must the Fel01~y Be One Affecting Credibility? 
At common law all felonies were infamous, and no distinction 
was drawn between felonies affecting credibility, as grand lar-
ceny, and those not affecting credibility, as involuntary man-
slaughter. Our Virginia statute likewise draws no such distinc-
tion. It now provides that the fact of conviction of felony or 
perjury may be shown in evidence to affect the credit of the 
witness.26 To date no case has been reversed because a trial 
court allowed impeachment of a witness by showing conviction 
of a felony not affecting credibility. 
But in Harold v. Commonwealth 21 there is the dictum of Judge 
Burks as follows : 
"Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, it is well settled in this 
state that the character of a witness for veracity cannot be 
impeached by proof of a prior conviction of crime, unless 
the crime be one which involved the character of the witness 
for veracity." 
Unfortunately the learned judge cites no authority for the 
statement that the rule is "well settled" insofar as conviction of 
felonies is concerned. The particular case involved proof of 
conviction of a witness for a minor violation of the then existing 
Federal prohibition law in the District of Columbia; only a mis-
demeanor. In Davidson v. Watts & Flint 28 the Supreme Court 
of Appeals considered the question of whether or not grand lar-
ceny was a felony affecting credibility, but since it obviously is 
such a felony, it was wholly unnecessary to determine (and the 
court did not determine) 29 what the result would have been had 
the felony not involved his character for truth. In Langhorne 
v. Commonwealth 30 in which similar language is used there was 
only an unnamed misdemeanor involved. And in Cutchin v. 
City of Roanoke 31 only the question of whether the reputation 
for chastity of a female witness could be shown by way of im-
"" VA. Coor: (Michie, 1936) § 4779. 
:zr Supra n. 25. 
"' Supra n. 9. 
""But cf. Note (1911) 16 VA. L. Rr:G. 689 . 
•. , Supra n. 23. 
3
' 113 Va. 452, 74 S. E. 403 (1912). 
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peachment was involved. There is no square holding that the 
felony must be one that involves the witness' character for truth, 
and in Fletcher v. Commonwealth 32 the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals held that no error was committed by asking the accused on 
cross examination if he had ever been convicted of a felony 
(where the felony was unlawfully but not maliciously shooting 
at an automobile ·occupied by passengers). The untenable ob-
jection was made that this was only a misdemeanor since the 
jury, in its discretion, had only sentenced him to jail and to pay 
a fine, although the witness could have been sent to the peniten-
tiary. Had the objection been made that such a felony does not 
involve one's reputation for truth we might have had a clear cut 
decision on this point. 
On principle it is difficult to see how the commission of a 
felony not affecting one's character for truth could be relevant 
on the question of veracity, but since the circumstances of each 
felony may vary greatly, it would be best not to have the hard 
and fast rule that our statute apparently fixes, but to let the 
court in its discretion determine in each case whether or not the 
conviction of the felony is relevant on the question of the wit-
ness' credibility. 
Method of Proof 
The witness is customarily asked on cross examination whether 
he has ·been convicted of such and such a felony. If he denies 
it, then the so-called best evidence rule applies and the record of 
conviction must be produced. 33 Since such fact could be proved 
independently by the record, the impeaching side is, of course, 
not bound by the witness' answer. 
Rehabilitation 
If a witness has been impeached by showing his conviction of 
a felony, the spirit of the rule laid down in George v. Pilcher 34 
would certainly allow the offering party to attempt to rehabilitate 
.. Supra n. 10. 
"For full discussion, see 2 WIGMO~ Evm£N~ (2d ed. 1923) • 
.. 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 299 (1877). 
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him by showing his present good reputation for truth. The 
Court in that case said, 
"Whenever the character of a witness for truth is attacked, 
either by direct evidence of want of truth, or by cross ex-
amination, * * * or, in general, whenever his character 
for truth is impeached in any way known to the law the party 
calling him may sustain him by evidence of his general repu-
tation for truth." (Italics added.) 35 
But the rule allowing rehabilitation is a very liberal one in 
this State, and can be best stated -by quoting from Mr. Justice 
Hudgins' majority opinion (three judges dissenting on another 
point) in Smith v. Commonwealth 36 as follows: 
"The only ground for the admissibilitv of evidence of a former 
conviction is to discredit the witness in the case then being 
tried. To remove that stain, or to weaken its weight, the ac-
cused has a right to show the nature of the charge, the mere 
fact, if it was a fact, that he was convicted on conflicting 
evidence, and that he had served his time or had been pa-
roled or pardoned by the governor." 
In the trial of the above case the trial court refused to allow 
the party offering the impeached witness to show that his con-
viction had been obtained by perjury, that this perjury had been 
admitted, and that the party committing the perjury had settled 
a civil action for the wrong committed by him in bearing false 
witness by the payment of $1,000. This refusal was held to 
constitute reversible error. 
Suggested Statutory Change 
In order to (a) make clear at a glance the meaning of the 
word "convict", (b) determine the status of a witness who has 
been convicted of a misdemeanor involving his character for 
truth, (c) determine the effect of a conviction of crime in an-
other jurisdiction, and (d) determine whether the conviction 
of felony must involve a crime affecting one's character for 
11 See also the decision of Mr. Justice Holmes in Gertz v. Fitchburg Rail-
road Company, 137 Mass. 77 (1884) . 
.. 161 Va. 1112, 172 S. E. 286 (1934). 
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truth, it is recommended that Section 4779 of the Code be 
changed from its 
Present Reading 
Section 4779. "Convicts as witnesses.-Conviction of felony 
or perjury shall not render the convict incompetent to testify, 




Section 4779. Impeachment of witnesses for conviction of 
crime.-Conviction of crime or perjury shall not render the per-
son convicted incompetent to testify, but the fact of conviction, 
wherever taking place, if involving character for truth, may be 
shown in evidence to affect his credit. 
D. W. Woodbridge. 
WILLIAMSBURG, VmGINIA. • 
